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Initial Public Offerings on the UK when-issued market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine the GHWHUPLQDQWVRIDQ,32ILUP¶Vdecision to trade on a when-issued market and 
find that better quality firms are more likely to trade on this market. Our µZKDW-LI¶DQDO\VLV
shows that for companies that choose to have when-issued trading, the actual offer price is 
almost 26% higher than it would have been had these firms chosen not to trade on this 
market. We interpret this higher offer price as a µUHQW¶WKDW investors pay to acquire shares of 
such companies. We also show that the informational accuracy of the UK when-issued 
market is better than that of continental European when-issued markets. 
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1. Introduction 
%HQYHQLVWHDQG6SLQGWDUJXHWKDW,32XQGHUZULWHUVSD\µLQIRUPDWLRQDOUHQWV¶WR
potential investors who provide them with truthful private information about the value of the 
IPO stock. These rents are paid in the form of allocations of underpriced shares. However, 
Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper (2006) show that, in the presence of a when-issued market 
that takes place simultaneously with the bookbuilding process (the German when-issued 
market), XQGHUZULWHUV GR QRW SD\ VXFK UHQWV WR LQYHVWRUV 7KLV LV GXH WR LQYHVWRUV¶ SULYDWH
information being revealed to the underwriters through their trades in the when-issued 
market, as the prices within this market are publicly observable. In this paper, we show that 
in a when-issued market with a setting fundamentally different to that of Germany, rents are 
paid and interestingly, the direction of payment is contrary to that predicted by Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989). In the UK when-issued market, it is the investors who pay rents to the 
underwriters of issuing firms. These rents are in the form of higher offer prices that investors 
pay to acquire shares of companies that choose to trade on the when-issued market.   
A when-issued market is a market in which trading in an IPO FRPSDQ\¶V VKDUHV
FRPPHQFHV D IHZ GD\V SULRU WR WKH VHFXULW\¶V RIILFLDO DGPLVVLRQ to the stock exchange.1 
While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) effectively prohibits such a market for 
IPOs in the US, many European countries have an active when-issued market (Cornelli, 
Goldreich and Ljungqvist 2006). Surprisingly, despite the larger VL]HRIWKHµ0DLQ0DUNHW¶of 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) relative to other European markets, there is no in-depth 
study that focuses on the when-issued trading on the LSE.2 Though it is not mandatory, there 
                                                             
1The when-issued market is also referred to as the grey market or conditional trading. In what follows, we use 
these terms interchangeably. 
2Most of the literature on IPO when-issued markets focuses on Germany. For example, Löffler et al. (2005) find 
that German grey market quotes are highly informative and good indicators of the first trading day¶V closing 
price. Aussenegg et al. (2006) find that when-issued trading in Germany reveals relevant information for the 
pricing of IPOs and that, once when-issued trading begins, bookbuilding is no longer a source of information for 
doing so. Dorn (2009) finds that retail buyers pay a hefty premium in the German when-issued market relative 
to the immediate aftermarket. For a sample of IPOs drawn from 12 European when-issued markets, Cornelli et 
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has been a substantial increase in the number of companies choosing to trade RQWKH/6(¶V
when-issued market. In the mid to late 1990s, less than 20% of the IPOs chose to trade on the 
LSE¶VZKHQ-issued market. However, since the early 2000s, almost 70% have opted to trade 
on this market. 
For a sample of LSE IPOs from 1996 to June 2017, we first focus on DILUP¶VGHFLVLRQ
to trade on the when-issued market. We investigate which types of firms are likely to choose 
to deal in such a market. Our results suggest that good quality firms are likely to do so. In 
particular, firms that are larger, less risky, have higher future growth opportunities and are 
underwritten by reputable underwriters are more likely to opt for trading on the when-issued 
market.  
One of the most important aspects of the IPO process is the LVVXHU¶V decision 
regarding the setting of an appropriate offer price. UVLQJDµZKDW-LI¶DQDO\VLVwe investigate 
whether or not the decision of an IPO firm to have a when-issued market is related to the 
pricing of its shares. We find that firms that choose to trade on the when-issued market offer 
their shares at a higher offer price. More specifically, for companies that trade on the when-
issued market, the actual average offer price is about 26% higher than it would have been had 
these firms chosen not to have a when-issued market. This evidence is robust when IPOs that 
choose to trade on the when-issued market are matched with those that GRQ¶W. We interpret 
this higher offer price DVDµUHQW¶WKDWLQYHVWRUVSD\WRWKH issuing firm in order to acquire its 
shares. We argue that there are two potential reasons for investors¶ ZLOOLQJQHVV WR SD\ this 
rent. First, investors perceive when-issued trading firms to be better quality IPOs and are 
willing to pay a premium for these firms.3 Second, when-issued trading has informational 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
al. (2006) find that high when-LVVXHG PDUNHW SULFHV DUH D YHU\ JRRG SUHGLFWRU RI WKH ILUVW WUDGLQJGD\¶V SULFH
However, most of the observations (75%) in their sample come from Germany. Less than 5% of their sample 
UHODWHVWRWKH8.¶VZKHQ-issued market.  
3
 This is consistent with our earlier results, which show that firms choosing to trade on the when-issued market 
are larger, carry lower risk, have higher future growth opportunities and are underwritten by reputable 
underwriters. 
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value for investors in that it offers them an opportunity to observe price discovery prior to the 
commencement of the unconditional/aftermarket trading.  
Our analysis of the pricing of IPOs that do not go to the when-issued market shows 
that their offer prices would have been substantially higher (44.6%) than their actual offer 
prices had they decided to trade on the when-issued market.4 This result further shows that in 
the UK setting, the decision to trade on the when-issued market results in a higher offer price. 
This is in contrast to the 6(&¶VDUJXPHQWDFFRUGLQJWRZKLFKa when-issued market for IPOs 
is not permitted in the US because it would lead to lower offer prices.5  
Apart from higher offer prices, there are other benefits of trading in the when-issued 
market. For example, firms that choose to do so have higher trading volumes than firms that 
do not. This result holds after controlling for company-specific factors and market conditions. 
Another benefit is that the prices in the when-issued market tend to be unbiased predictors of 
the closing price on the first day of unconditional trading.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we discuss our 
research questions. In Section 3 we provide a detailed discussion RI WKH 8.¶V ZKHQ-issued 
market and compare it to the when-issued markets of continental Europe. In Section 4 we 
provide details of our data and methodology while in Section 5 we present our results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Research questions 
The focus of our paper is to seek answers to three important questions relating to the 
use of the when-issued market by firms conducting an IPO. First, what types of firms choose 
to trade in the when-issued market? Second, does the decision to do so have any impact on 
                                                             
4For some of the IPOs that do not use the when-issued market, it could be that they apply to trade on the market 
but their applications are turned down by the LSE. We discuss this in greater detail in Section 3. Our request for 
anonymised information on failed when-issued market applications was turned down by the UK regulator. 
5
 Paragraph II.F of the Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 38067 (20 December 1996). 
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the setting of the offer price? Third, are there any benefits for firms that decide to trade on the 
when-issued market? We discuss these research questions in greater detail below.  
Firms conducting an IPO on the LSE can choose whether or not to trade on the when-
issued market. Our first research question relates to the types of firms which are likely to 
choose to trade in such a market. The LSE prescribes certain minimum requirements for IPO 
companies to be allowed to trade on the when-issued market. One of the requirements is for 
the security to be sufficiently liquid, taking into consideration the size of the issue. Another 
requirement is that there should be sufficient demand for the security during the period of 
when-issued dealing. :KLOH WKH /6( GRHV QRW SUHFLVHO\ GHILQH µVXIILFLHQW OLTXLGLW\¶ RU
µVXIILFLHQW GHPDQG¶ LW LV UHDVRQDEOH WR H[SHFW WKDW ODUJH EHWWHU TXDOLW\ ILUPV ZLOO Rpt for 
trading in a when-issued market.  
Our second research question relates to the impact (if any) of the decision to trade on 
the when-issued market on the pricing of the IPO. When-issued trading in the UK has two 
important characteristics. First, the decision to have a when-issued market precedes the 
setting of the offer price. Second, when-issued trading provides benefits to investors in terms 
of price discovery before the start of the secondary trading and an earlier opportunity to enter 
or exit IPO investment. We are interested in analysing whether firms that plan when-issued 
WUDGLQJ H[WUDFW D µUHQW¶ IURP WKHLU QHZ LQYHVWRUV IRU SURYLGLQJ WKHVH EHQHILWV WR WKHP 7KLV
rent could be in the form of a higher offer price. If this is indeed the case, we should observe 
higher offer prices for IPO companies that have when-issued markets than would have been 
observed had these companies not had conditional trading. 
 Our final research question relates to the benefits to the IPO firms of choosing to trade 
on the when-issued market. Of all the likely benefits, we focus on one: the aftermarket 
liquidity of shares. We seek to answer the following question: do firms with when-issued 
trading have higher market liquidity than those that do not? Controlling for the size of the 
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IPO firm, we compare the volumes on the first day of trading for firms with and without 
when-issued markets.  
3. When-issued dealing on the LSE 
The UK has an active when-issued IPO market. According to the LSE, the when-
issued market allows investors the ability to trade a new issue ahead of its full listing. It also 
facilitates price formation ahead of unconditional admission to trading and allows investors 
the earliest opportunity to agree an entry or exit price of an IPO according to their investment 
requirements. 
Under Rules 1530-1532 of the LSE, when-LVVXHGGHDOLQJLVDµSHULRGRIGHDOLQJZLWK
GHIHUUHGVHWWOHPHQW¶ /RQGRQ6WRFN([FKDQJH, 2017). All transactions that take place 
during the when-issued period are conditional on the security being admitted to trading on the 
stock exchange. The settlement of these transactions will not take place until the listing of the 
security on the exchange has occurred. If the security is not listed then all the when-issued 
trades will be void.  
The when-issued trading in the UK is an on-exchange activity conducted either under 
WKH/6(¶VHOHFWURQLFRUGHUERRNRUoff-ERRNELODWHUDOO\EHWZHHQWKH/6(¶VPHPEHUILUPV,I
when-LVVXHGWUDQVDFWLRQVDUHH[HFXWHGRIIWKH/6(¶VRUGHUERRNWKHQWKH\have to be reported 
to the stock exchange. This allows investors to observe the when-issued prices on the LSE¶V 
website. 
Companies have to satisfy a number of requirements as a prerequisite for admission to 
the when-issued market. For example, the requirements state that there must be a fair and 
orderly market for the securities; the newly issued securities must be sufficiently liquid, 
taking into account the size of the offer; the settlement must be in electronic form; and there 
must also be sufficient demand for the security during the when- issued period. 
Figure 1 shows the timeline before, during and after the when-issued period on the 
LSE. The LSE requirements stipulate that a draft application form for the when-issued 
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dealing and a draft prospectus must be submitted at least ten days prior to the first day of the 
when-issued trading period. The form for the when-issued trading has to be finalised at least 
two business days before the trading starts on the when-issued market. The deadline date for 
subscription to the IPO shares is usually the day before the commencement of the when-
issued trading. This is also the date the LSE expects confirmation that the prospectus has 
been approved by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA). This is the point the LSE informs 
market participants of the proposed timetable for the when-issued and unconditional trading. 
These events are shown in Stage 1 of the figure. In the second stage, the IPO firm announces 
the final offer price and share allocation just before the start (usually the morning of the first 
day) of trading on the when-issued market. The UK when-issued trading usually lasts for 
three days, but the LSE has the discretion to consider shorter or longer periods on a case-by-
case basis (Stage 3). Once the when-issued trading ends, unconditional trading commences. 
This is shown in Stage 4 of the figure. The above timeline of when-issued dealing is best 
explained with the example of the Royal Mail, which carried out an IPO on the 15th of 
October 2013. The deadline for subscription for shares was the 8th of October. The offer price 
and allocation details were announced at 7:00am on the 11th of October. When-issued trading 
in Royal Mail shares began at 8:00am on the same day and carried on for an extra day (until 
the 14th of October). Unconditional dealing began on the 15th of October.  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
3.1. When-issued dealing in the UK and in other European markets 
7KH8.¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDOsetup for when-issued dealing is different from that in other European 
markets. We primarily focus on the key differences between the UK and German when-
issued markets.6 
                                                             
6This is mainly due to three important reasons: first, Germany has the most active European grey market; 
second, almost all existing academic literature is focused on German conditional trading; third, the grey markets 
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Table 1 highlights the main regulatory differences between the UK (LSE) and 
German (Frankfurt Stock Exchange, FSE) when-issued markets. One major difference 
between the two when-issued markets LV WKDW WKH IRUPHU KDV WR IROORZ WKH /6(¶V UXOHV
whereas the latter is conducted over the counter, by independent brokers who quote bid-ask 
spreads. 
In the UK, investors can subscribe for the IPO shares up to the last day and, in some 
cases, up to an hour before conditional trading starts. In contrast, in Germany, investors can 
subscribe for the IPO shares until the last day of the conditional trading (Aussenegg et al., 
2006, Löffler et al., 2005). In addition, in the UK, the final offer price is determined just 
before the when-issued dealing commences, whereas in Germany it is set on the last day of 
when-issued dealing.  
Another difference between the two markets is related to the actual allocation of the 
IPO shares. In the UK, investors are notified of their allocation just before the when-issued 
dealing starts (usually a few hours before the start of trading), whereas in Germany this takes 
place on the last day of the grey market (Aussenegg et al., 2006, Löffler et al., 2005). This 
difference between the two markets highlights that investors on the LSE know the number of 
shares they have been allocated before the start of when-issued trading. In contrast, investors 
in Germany conduct trades on the grey market in the expectation that they will be allocated 
some shares. In certain cases, German investors may find themselves as short sellers if they 
are allocated fewer shares than they have applied for or if no shares are allocated to them. 
Finally, the two markets differ in the length of the conditional trading period. When-issued 
trading in the UK usually lasts three days whereas in Germany it lasts five to seven days. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
in other European countries, such as France, Spain, Switzerland and Italy, are similar to that of Germany 
(Cornelli et al., 2006). In the US, a grey market for IPOs is prohibited (Regulation M, Rule 105). 
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In addition to the institutional differences between the UK and other European when-
issued markets, the two also differ in other important aspects. For example, while the LSE 
decides on when-issued trading applications on a case-by-case basis, almost every IPO firm 
in Germany can be admitted to the grey market. Indeed, almost 94% of the German IPOs 
have a grey market (Aussenegg et al., 2006) whereas at an average, only 44% of the UK IPO 
firms do so (as shown in Table 2 later). Further, German IPOs can be withdrawn during the 
when-issued period (Cornelli et al., 2006) whereas, in our sample, we do not have a single 
withdrawal during the when-issued period.  
To summarise, the institutional setup and the characteristics of the when-issued 
market in the UK are quite different to those of other European markets. Unlike the 
continental European when-issued markets which help IPO firms in setting their offer price 
and aid potential investors in deciding if they will apply for shares, the UK when-issued 
market carries none of these benefits. Why then, an increasing number of UK IPOs are opting 
to trade in such a market? The UK¶V when-issued market provides an interesting setup for 
studying D ILUP¶s decision to have a when-issued market and the impact this decision may 
have on the pricing of its IPO.  
4. Data and methodology 
We conduct our study on the Main Market of the LSE and the data include all non-financial 
IPOs that took place during the period from January 1996 to June 2017. We start our analysis 
from 1996 because, prior to this year, the percentage of IPOs with when-issued markets was 
very low (less than 5%). It is common practice for IPO studies (Boulton and Campbell, 2016 
and Bajo, Chemmanur, Simonyan, and Tehranian, 2016) to exclude firms from the financial 
sector. Most of the financial sector firms report their assets and liabilities differently as 
compared to non-financial firms. The process of setting the offer price may also be different 
for some financial firms relative to non-financial firms. For example, UK investment trust 
IPOs tend to sell their shares at a fixed offer price of 100 pence per share. Due to these 
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reasons we have excluded all financial and investment and unit trusts (mutual fund) IPOs 
from our sample. Furthermore, we exclude IPOs listed on AIM for three reasons. First, 
regulations on AIM admissions are very different from that of the Main Market. Second, the 
number of AIM IPOs choosing to trade on the WI market has historically been quite low. 
Third, underwriting arrangements in the AIM market are quite different from that of the Main 
Market. For example, AIM IPOs have a nominated advisor (NOMAD) who can also act as an 
underwriter, whereas there is no such arrangement in the Main Market. We also exclude 78 
IPOs that issued Global Depository Receipts, 4 IPOs for which listing documents were not 
available, 4 IPOs for which stock price data were unavailable and 30 firms that were 
categorised as IPOs, but were listed on other stock exchanges previously. Our final sample 
consists of 432 non-financial IPO firms of which 188 have when-issued trading and the 
remaining 244 do not.  
Information on whether a company has a when-issued market is extracted from the 
IPO prospectus. The offer price, gross proceeds, market capitalisation, secondary shares sold 
in the IPO, total assets, date of incorporation, and number of underwriters in the syndicate are 
also collected from the prospectuses. The stock price data, such as closing, opening, bid and 
ask daily prices ± including the when-issued market period, the IPO daily volume of trading 
and the levels of the FTSE All-Share Index ± are extracted from Datastream.  
4.1. When-issued trading and the offer price 
$Q,32ILUP¶Vdecision to have a when-issued market may not be random and it may 
also have an effect on the setting of the offer price. It is reasonable to assume that IPO firms 
may self-select their preferred choices such as trading on the when-issued market or to use a 
placing to list on the stock market.7 Therefore, the decision to have conditional trading might 
                                                             
7
 )LUPV FDQ FKRRVH HLWKHUD µSODFLQJ¶ RU D µSXEOLF RIIHU¶ WR OLVW RQ WKH /RQGRQ 6WRFN ([FKDQJH ,QD SODFLQJ
shares are usually not underwritten unlike a public offer and the shares are often offered to institutional and high 
net worth investors. For further details see Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2006). 
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be an endogenous choice made by the IPO firm and its underwriter. This is consistent with Li 
and Prabhala (2007) and Hamilton and Nickelson (2003) who document that firms rarely 
make decisions that are random. To address the possible endogeneity problem, we use a 
sample selection model proposed by Dahl (2002). This model extends the classic Heckman 
(1979) model in two ways: first, it models various choices as opposed to a single choice in 
the selection equation. Second, the probabilities of these choices are transformed through a 
polynomial function.  
The Dahl (2002) selection model proceeds as follows. Consider the following two 
equations:  
                                      
1 1 1R  E PX
    (1) 
                                     
kkk ZP KJ  *
                    N ««««P 
Where equation (1) is a linear regression model and equation (2) is a probability (or 
choice) model. R1 is the offer price and the variable X contains control variables, industry and 
year dummies. P is the disturbance term of the outcome equation and satisfies E(µ1|X,Z)=0 
DQG9_;= ı2. P*k is the probability of observing IPOs that have decided not to use the 
when-issued market or a placing contract. k is a categorical variable and describes m choices 
(m=1 for when-issued market, m=2 for placing and m=3 for other listing methods such as 
public offer). The variable Z contains control variables for the joint probability of trading on 
the when-issued market and to use a placing. Kk is the residual of the selection model, 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The offer price (R1) is observed only when 
the IPO firm decides to trade on the when issued-market. This condition is expressed as 
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The conditional probability (P*k ) is estimated through a multinomial logit using 
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where P j is the probability of choosing when-issued market and method j for listing (i.e. 
placing), which are estimated through a multinomial logit. The correction term for the second 
stage is transformed probability from stage one using a polynomial approximation:  
                                             
   njjj PMP OO  
        (5)                                 
Where Mj is a dummy variable that equals one for choice j and zero otherwise, n is the 
degree of the polynomial function for PjȜPj) is a sample correction term, which depends on 
the probability Pj and is equivalent to the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman model. The 
FRUUHFWLRQ IXQFWLRQ Ȝ) is assumed to have the same form for all listing choices. The offer 
price is estimated using a pooled cross-sectional regression and is given by 
                                            
 j jX P                     1j jR j E  O  ]  
       (6) 
Where Rj is the offer price for method j (j=1 for when-issued market and j=2 for other 
listing choices Ȝ3j) is the sample correction term and includes first- and second-order 
polynomial approximations of the probability of an IPO firm choosing a specific method. 
Equations 5 and 6 are estimated simultaneously. 
The independent variables used in the first stage are mainly drawn from the literature 
and from WKH /6(¶V ZKHQ-issued dealing requirements. One of these requirements is that 
there must be sufficient demand for the security within the when-issued market. As a result, 
we expect riskier companies not to have when-issued market as there may not be sufficient 
demand for their shares. We include three variables as proxies for the ex-ante uncertainty of 
the IPO: the money raised from selling existing shares in the IPO as a percentage of the total 
gross proceeds, the inverse of the offer price and the age of the firm. 
In addition, we control for underwriter reputation because, according to the 
certification hypothesis (Shiller, 1989), investors decide whether to buy the shares of an IPO 
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based on the quality of the underwriter. As a result, the more reputable the underwriter is, the 
higher the demand will be for the IPO shares. The Carter and Manaster (1990) measure of 
underwriter reputation IUHTXHQWO\ XVHG IRU 86 ,32V LVQ¶W VXLWDEOH IRU the European market 
(Migliorati and Vismara 2014). We use two different measures of underwriter reputation that 
are similar in spirit to those suggested by Migliorati and Vismara (2014) and Goergen et al. 
(2006). The first measure is based on the gross proceeds and the second on the number of 
IPOs underwritten by the underwriter during the two years before the IPO.  
Another of the /6(¶VZKHQ-issued dealing requirements states that the security should 
be sufficiently liquid, taking into account the size of the issue. We use the total assets of the 
company in the year before the IPO as a proxy for the size of the issue. Moreover, the when-
issued dealing requirements also state WKDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vunderwriter has to submit draft and 
final application forms for when-issued dealing at least ten and two business days 
respectively before the commencement of when-issued trading. In order to capture the market 
return prior to the start of the when-issued dealing, we calculate the return on the FTSE All-
Share Index for the two-month period that ends ten days prior to the first day of trading on 
the when-issued market. In addition, we calculate the volatility of the FTSE All-Share Index 
during the two-month period ending two days before the first day of trading on the when-
issued market. Aussenegg et al. (2006) and Löffler et al. (2005) use similar measures. 
We also control for new-economy companies by including a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the company belongs to the technology sector and zero otherwise.  We 
have used the likelihood ratio test to examine a variable that has no impact on the choice of 
trading on when-issued market or placing, but has impact on the offer price. Based on the 
likelihood ratio test, we find that book to market has no impact on the probability of trading 
on the when-issued market and placing, but has impact on the offer price. Therefore, we have 
included book to market in the second stage and not in the first stage model.  
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Finally, wH XVH D µZKDW-LI¶ W\SH RI DQDO\VLV to assess the benefits of a when-issued 
market. This is because we can only observe the offer price for a company with a when-
issued market, and not what the price would have been had the same company chosen not to 
trade on the when-issued market (counterfactual). 
4.2. Volume on the first day of trading 
In order to examine whether the when-issued market has any effect on the volume on 
the first day of trading, controlling for size, we run the following OLS regression: 
 
(7) 
Where  is the volume on the first day of trading and is calculated as the total number of 
shares traded on the first day of unconditional trading divided by outstanding shares, and  
includes all the independent variables that may affect . Two of the independent variables 
are of particular importance. The first is the when-issued dummy that takes a value of one if 
the company had a when-issued market and zero otherwise. The second is the size of the 
company, which is captured by the   value of the total assets for the year prior to the IPO.   
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the total number of IPOs and those that had and did 
not have a when-issued market during 1996-2017. Nearly half (44%) of the IPOs had 
conditional trading during the sample period. This is much lower than the 94% figure for the 
German IPOs that have a grey market (Aussenegg et al., 2006) and much higher than the 
4.1% figure reported by Cornelli et al. (2006) for their UK sample.8 The figures reported in 
Table 2 also show that the use of when-issued trading is more common in recent IPOs than it 
has been in the past. For example, between 1996 and 2000, no more than 15% of the IPOs 
                                                             
8
 Cornelli et al. (2006) report a much lower figure for two reasons: (1) Their UK sample includes both the Main 
Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM) IPOs. Very few AIM IPOs have a when-issued market. (2) 
Their study covers a period (1997-2002) during which trading on the when-issued market was uncommon. 
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chose to trade in the when-issued market. Since 2000, the average proportion of IPOs 
choosing to trade in the when-issued market has increased steadily to about 80%. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 reports information on the characteristics of the IPOs that trade on the when-
issued market. The table also provides a comparison between IPOs with when-issued market 
and those without. Panel A shows that the average (median) number of trading days in the 
when-issued market is 3.57 (3.09). This is above the figure given in the /6(¶Vrequirements 
(London Stock Exchange, 2017), which stipulate that the when-issued dealing period should 
typically last for three business days. The LSE has the discretion to consider shorter or longer 
periods. The average return on the first day of when-issued trading is 13.26%.  
The volume of trading (shares traded during the when-issued market as a percentage 
of the outstanding shares) on the first day of when-issued trading is much higher than the 
average volume of trading during the remaining days of when-issued market (20.65% vs. 
3.01%). This suggests that the vast majority of trades take place on the first day of the when-
issued market. This is in stark contrast to the low figure of 0.48% reported by Löffler et al. 
(2005) for the German grey market. One plausible explanation for this difference is that the 
German grey market is dominated by smaller and younger companies (Cornelli et al., 2006). 
These companies are generally less liquid than their larger and more established counterparts. 
It is the latter type of companies that are admitted to the UK¶V when-issued market.  
The bid-ask spread during the when-issued period is very low (about 1.7%). This 
suggests that the liquidity of the UK IPO when-issued market is very high. This is in stark 
contrast to the when-issued markets of other European countries, where the bid-ask spread is 
at least five times higher than that in the UK. For instance, the bid-ask spreads within the 
grey markets of Germany, France, Spain and Austria are 10.2%, 8.3%, 10.3% and 13.8% 
respectively (Cornelli et al., 2006). Therefore, the suggestion that institutional investors do 
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not participate in the grey market because of the high bid-ask spread, may not hold in the 
context of the UK¶V when-issued market. Cornelli et al. (2006) report a bid-ask spread of 3% 
for the LSE. The difference (1.7% vs. 3%) may be entirely due to the fact that their sample 
also includes AIM IPOs, which are typically smaller firms.  
Panel B of Table 3 compares the two groups of IPOs: those that had a when-issued 
market and those that did not. The figures show that firms with when-issued trading have 
very different characteristics to those that do not. More specifically, when-issued IPOs are 
younger (5.86 vs. 7.55 years), less risky (have a ORZHUµLQYHUVH of issue price¶YDOXH) and of 
better quality as they sell their shares at higher prices (£3.75 vs. £1.71).9  
When-issued IPOs are less underpriced, as the mean (median) return on the first day 
of unconditional trading is 15% (8.41%), whereas the equivalent for IPOs without conditional 
trading is 18.26% (11.78%). The degree of underpricing for the German grey market IPOs is 
more than triple than that for our sample, and ranges from 40% to 50% (Aussenegg et al., 
2006, Cornelli et al., 2006, Dorn, 2009).  
Firms in our when-issued-market sample are much larger (£1234.18 vs. £38.08 
million total assets). When-issued-market IPOs are, on average, underwritten by a syndicate 
of 4.72 investment banks, whereas the IPOs that do not have a when-issued market are 
underwritten by a syndicate of 1.53 investment banks. This is again different from the 
German market in which both samples (grey market/no grey market) of IPOs are 
underwritten by approximately the same number of investment banks (Dorn, 2009). Firms 
that have conditional trading in the UK pay a higher commission fee to their underwriters 
(3.47% vs. 2.21%) and are underwritten by more reputable investment banks.  
                                                             
9
 According to Fang (2005), Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Allen (1984), higher prices are an 
indicator of superior quality. The reasoning behind this argument is that, when quality is ex ante unobserved, as 
is the case for the IPO companies, a higher price guarantees better quality because the present value of future 
income exceeds the short-term profit that could be made from selling low-quality securities at high prices. 
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The volume of trading on the first day of unconditional trading for the when-issued 
IPOs is much lower than that for the sample without a grey market (1.77% vs. 7.45%). This is 
not surprising given that most of the trading for the when-issued-market IPO sample takes 
place on the first day of conditional trading (see Panel A). For when-issued market IPOs, the 
trading volume on the first day of conditional trading (20.65%) is much higher than the 
trading volume of the first day of unconditional trading for IPOs that do not trade on the 
when-issued market (7.45%). The results also show that there are significant differences 
between the means (0.80% vs. 0.49%) and between the medians (0.49% vs. 0.48%) of the 
trading volumes for the first month of unconditional trading (excluding the first day for both 
samples), for the samples with and without when-issued markets. 
The mean bid-ask spread during the first month of unconditional trading for the when-
issued IPOs sample is almost two thirds of that for IPOs without when-issued trading (2.03% 
vs. 3.24%). This suggests that IPOs with conditional trading are more liquid than those 
without it. Money raised from the selling of existing shares (Secondary %) is similar for IPOs 
traded on the when-issued market and those that are not.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
5.2. The decision of whether to trade on the when-issued market or not 
In order to examine which types of companies choose to trade on the when-issued 
market, we use a Dahl (2002) selection model. The results are reported in Table 4. Model 1 
reports the probability of IPO firms choosing the when-issued market (i.e dependent variable 
= 1) and Model 2 shows the probability of IPO firms choosing a placing (i.e dependent 
variable = 2). We use multinomial logit in the selection equation because of a strong 
possibility that the decisions to trade on when-issued market and/or to use placing are jointly 
determined. The results in both Models 1&2 show that riskier IPOs, as measured by the 
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inverse of the issue price and IPOs with larger secondary IPO shares have a negative 
relationship with the probability of trading on when-issued market (Model 1) and the 
probability of using a placing (Model 2). These results suggest that the probability of an IPO 
firm choosing to have a when-issued market or a placing will be lower for riskier IPOs and 
those with large secondary shares offered at the IPO.   
Furthermore, the probability of having a when-issued market or using a placing is also 
affected by the size of the company (total assets is used as a proxy for size) and the 
XQGHUZULWHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQ. The larger is the company, the higher is the probability of it having 
when-issued trading or using a placing. Interestingly, the higher the reputation of the 
underwriters, the more likely it is for the IPO to have a when-issued market. This evidence is 
robust using alternative proxies for underwriter reputation. 
 The age of the firm has no impact on the decision to trade on the when-issued market. 
Similarly, the volatility and the return on the market index (FTSE All-Share Index) prior to 
the IPO have no influence on a comSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRWUDGHRQWKHZKHQ-issued market or use 
a placing. Further, the sector of the IPO firm (high-tech vs. non-high-tech) has no impact on 
these choices. 
To summarize, companies that are large, have lower risk and in which insiders sell a 
lower proportion of their shares in the IPO, are more likely to trade on the when-issued 
market. IPOs underwritten by reputable underwriters are also more likely to have a when-
issued market.  
TABLE 4 HERE 
5.3. Does the decision to have a when-issued market affect the IPO offer price? 
The results shown in Table 4 above are used in the first stage (reduced form) to 
estimate the first and second order polynomial error correction term. In the second-stage 
regression, the natural logarithm of one plus the offer price is regressed on the correction 
terms and the independent variables separately for the two IPO sub-samples: those that had a 
19 
 
when-issued market and those that did not. In Table 5, we report the second-stage regressions 
results.  
The results reported in Table 5 show that IPOs that choose to trade in the when-issued 
market, and those that do not, are subject to a selection bias. This is reflected in the 
statistically significant FRUUHFWLRQ WHUPV ȜP1 DQG ȜP2) for the sub-sample that traded and 
that did not trade on the when-issued market. However, the evidence of sample selection is 
stronger for IPOs that did not trade on when-issued market. Further, we find that companies 
that are large and have low book-to-market ratios (higher growth opportunities) are likely to 
choose higher offer prices. Younger firms and firms that are underwritten by high reputation 
underwriters also choose higher offer prices.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The results reported in Tables 4 and 5 could be driven by the idiosyncrasies of firms 
going public in the 1996-2000 period. This is because the distribution of our sample IPOs 
without a WI market is heavily skewed to the dot com bubble and the bubble run-up period 
(194 out of 229 IPOs did not trade on the WI market during this period). However, IPOs with 
a WI market are skewed to the post-2001 period (151 out of 197 IPOs traded on the WI 
market during this period). We address this issue by partitioning our sample and running our 
regressions using the post-2001 IPOs sample only. Overall, our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged.10  
We use the coefficients in Table 5 to estimate what the offer price would have been 
had the alternative choice (to have a when-issued market or not) been made. We then 
compare these forecasts with the actual offer prices. The results are reported in Table 6. For 
                                                             
10
 We are grateful to the referee for suggesting this test. Results are not reported in the paper, but are available 
from the authors on request. 
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the IPOs that trade in the when-issued market, the mean actual offer price is £3.75 but would 
have been 26% lower (£2.765) if the company had decided not to do so. This suggests that 
the decision to trade in the when-issued market does affect the setting of the offer price. In 
other words, IPO firms that choose to trade in the when-LVVXHGPDUNHWWHQGWRH[WUDFWDµUHQW¶
from their investors through higher issue prices.  
For the IPOs that did not trade on the when-issued market, the average offer price was 
£1.71 but would have been £2.473 (44.6% higher) if they had traded on it. This finding 
sharply contrasts with WKH866(&¶VDUJXPHQWWKat a grey market may result in lower offer 
prices. However, this comparison should be interpreted with caution given the difference in 
institutional settings between the US and UK markets.  
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
5.4. Volume on the first day of trading 
The results reported in Table 3 show that the volume on the first day of trading for the 
sample of IPOs that chose to trade in the when-issued market was almost three times that of 
the sub-sample that did not trade on the when-issued market. In addition, the figures show a 
significant difference between the size (using total assets) of the firms in the two sub-samples 
(the when-issued sample firms being far larger than the other). Therefore, one may argue that 
the difference in the volume of trading could be due to the difference in the average size of 
the firms in the two samples of IPOs, and consequently that the when-issued market does not 
have any effect on volume. In order to address this, we run an OLS regression in which the 
dependent variable is the trading volume (expressed as a percentage of the outstanding 
shares) on the first day of trading. We control for a number of variables, including the size of 
the firm (total assets) and a dummy variable taking a value of one for IPOs that traded on the 
when-issued market and zero otherwise.   
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The results reported in Table 7 show that the when-issued dummy variable is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, after controlling for company-specific factors 
(secondary shares offered in the IPO, the inverse of the offer price, age, size, growth 
prospects and industry), underwriter reputation and market conditions. The volume on the 
first day of trading is approximately 10% higher for companies with a when-issued market 
than for those without. This suggests that the large difference between the trading volumes of 
the two sub-samples cannot be fully explained just by the difference in the IPO firms¶ 
characteristics, market conditions or the XQGHUZULWHU¶V UHSXWDWLRQ Indeed, the when-issued 
market plays an important role in enhancing the first GD\¶Vtrading volume.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
5.5. Informational accuracy of the when-issued market 
In our final piece of analysis we test the informational accuracy of the UK when-
issued market prices following the approach used by Löffler et al. (2005). We compute 
pricing errors to examine whether conditional trading prices are unbiased predictors of the 
closing prices on the first day of unconditional trading. Table 8 reports the pricing errors for 
the whole sample of IPOs with a when-issued market (Panel A), an over/fairly priced sub-
sample (Panel B) and an underpriced sub-sample (Panel C). The figures in Panel A show that 
the mean pricing errors during the when-issued market are much lower than the offer price 
error. For instance, the mean pricing error on the first day of the when-issued period is just 
under one percent (0.977%), whereas the mean offer price error is much higher (11.33%) and 
the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the mean 
pricing errors within the when-issued period fall significantly from the first to the last day of 
trading (0.977% vs. 0.407%). The pricing error on the last day of the conditional trading 
period is only 0.407%. This implies that the price on the last day of the when-issued period is 
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almost equal to that on the first day of unconditional trading. The decline in the pricing error 
during the when-issued market period demonstrates that pricing accuracy improves as we 
approach the first day of the unconditional period. This is also true for the overpriced (Panel 
B) and underpriced (Panel C) IPOs. This improvement in pricing accuracy may be due to two 
reasons: First, divergence of opinion about the true value of the IPO firms may narrow during 
the when-issued market period and this should lead to a price convergence. Second, as argued 
by Löffler et al. (2005), any private information that institutional investors might have would 
gradually be incorporated into the when-issued prices.  
The above results indicate that the when-issued prices are significantly more 
informative than the IPO offer prices and are good proxies for the closing prices on the first 
day of unconditional trading. The when-issued errors, offer-price error and standard 
deviations of the errors for the UK when-issued-market IPOs are much lower than those 
reported by Löffler et al. (2005) for the German grey-market IPOs. Our findings imply that 
the informational accuracy of the UK when-issued market is better than that of Germany. 
One potential explanation for this is that German investors can only observe bid and ask 
quotes and not the actual when-issued transaction prices as is the case in the UK. This is due 
to the fact that German offer prices are set on the last day of the grey market whereas in the 
UK they are finalised just before the start of trading in the when-issued market. This may also 
explain the fact that investors who buy German IPO shares during the grey-market period and 
sell them on the first day of unconditional trading would, on average, incur losses as the 
German grey-market quotes are significantly higher than the first-day unconditional market 
prices (Löffler et al., 2005, Dorn, 2009). However, this is not the case for the UK when-
issued IPOs, whose when-issued prices are, on average, not significantly different from the 
first-day unconditional market prices. 
 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
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As a further test of the accuracy of the when-issued prices, we regress the market 
prices on the first day of unconditional trading on the prices on the first day of the when-
issued market. The results are reported in Table 9 and show that when-issued prices are better 
proxies for the closing prices on the first day of unconditional trading than the offer prices 
(Panel A). This evidence is consistent even after splitting the sample into over/fairly priced 
(Panel B) or underpriced (Panel C) observations. We also test whether the when-issued prices 
and the offer prices are unbiased estimators of the closing market prices on the first day of 
unconditional trading WKHµWUXHSULFH¶ using the Mincer-Zarnowitz test for unbiasedness. We 
find when-issued prices to EH XQELDVHG HVWLPDWRUV RI WKH µWUXH SULFH¶ 7KLV LV LQ FRQWUDVW WR
Löffler et al.¶V (2005) results, according to which the first-day price and the midpoint range 
of the prices across the German grey-market trading period are not unbiased predictors of the 
closing price on the first day of unconditional trading.  
 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
Overall, the results reported in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that the informational 
asymmetries that may exist for UK IPO firms during the subscription period can be lowered 
significantly by opting to trade on the when-issued market. Therefore, any informational 
disadvantage that uninformed (usually retail) investors may have is substantially reduced 
through the when-issued market prices. This is consistent with Löffler et al.¶V (2005) 
suggestion that the when-LVVXHGPDUNHWFDQDOOHYLDWHWKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHSUREOHP 
 Finally we investigate whether a higher offer price is DQRXWFRPHRIDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQ
to trade on the grey market or PHUHO\DUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHILUP¶V characteristics at the time of 
listing. We use propensity score matching, to match each IPO firm that chooses to trade in 
grey market with non-grey market IPOs by age, size and secondary proceeds at the time of 
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listing. Results are reported in Table 10. It is evident from Panel A of the table that grey 
market IPOs are similar to their matched non-grey market counterparts in terms of age, size 
and secondary proceeds. Interestingly, the mean (£3.788 vs. £ 2.53) and median (£2.648 vs. 
2.137) offer price of the grey market IPOs is higher than those IPOs choosing not to trade on 
this market (Panel B). This suggests that a higher offer price is driven by the grey market and 
not merely by the characteristics of the IPO firms. Hence, a decision to trade on the grey 
market adds value to the offer price of the IPO firms regardless of the firm characteristics at 
the time of listing 
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine why some UK IPO firms choose to trade on the when-issued market. We 
focus on (i) the types of IPO firms that are likely to trade on the when-issued market, (ii) 
whether or not the decision of an IPO firm to have a when-issued market affects the setting of 
its offer price, and (iii) the benefits of trading on the when-issued market. We find that firms 
that are larger, less risky, have higher future growth opportunities, are underwritten by 
reputable underwriters and for which insiders sell a smaller proportion of their shares in the 
offering are more likely to trade on the when-issued market. The offer price for firms that 
choose to trade on the when-issued market is on average 26% higher than it would have been 
had these companies chosen not to trade on it. This suggests that the decision to trade on the 
when-issued market is related to the setting of the offer price for the issue. The evidence is 
robust using propensity score matching where when-issued IPOs are matched with their non-
grey market counterparts. We interpret this higher offer prLFHDVDµUHQW¶WKDWLQYHVWRUV pay to 
acquire shares of better-quality firms that usually trade on the when-issued market.  
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Additional benefits of choosing to trade on the UK when-issued market include higher 
trading volumes and better price accuracy. For companies that trade in the when-issued 
market, the volume of trading is approximately 10% higher than for companies that do not. 
The trading prices in the UK when-issued market appear to be more informative for investors 
than those in continental European grey markets such as Germany¶V.  
Overall, our results suggest that there are tangible benefits of choosing to trade on the 
UK when-issued market. These benefits accrue to both the issuing firms and their potential 
investors. More and more IPO firms seem to be recognising these benefits and choosing to 
trade on this market. IPO investors benefit from trading in such market through acquisition of 
shares in a better quality firms. $OO LQ DOO /6(¶V REMHFWLYHV RI SURYLGLQJ D ZKHQ-issued 
market in the UK are by and large being achieved. 
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Figure 1: Timeline of when-issued trading in the UK 
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Table 1: Regulatory differences in the when-issued market trading in the 
UK (LSE) and Germany (FSE) 
 LSE FSE 
Conditional trading takes 
place over-the-counter No Yes 
   
End of subscription period 
Usually the last day before 
when-issued trading 
commences 
Usually the last day of the 
when-issued market 
   
Setting of the offer price Before when-issued trading 
commences 
Last day of the when-issued 
market 
   
Allocation of shares Before when-issued trading 
commences 
Last day of the when-issued 
market 
   
Commencement of when-
issued dealing 
After the allocation of shares 
is complete and the offer 
price has been announced 
Usually when the price range 
is announced 
   
Number of days conditional 
dealing lasts Approximately 3 days Approximately 5 to 7 days 
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Table 2: IPOs with and without when-issued (WI) markets 
 
For the period 1996-2017(June), this table shows the split between IPOs that had a when-issued market 
and those that did not. 
 
Period IPOs with 
a WI market 
IPOs without 
 a WI market Total 
% of IPOs with a 
WI market 
1996 ± 2000 
         35 194 229 15.28 
2001± 2005 34 15 49 71.40 
2006 ± 2010 48 19 67 71.60 
2011 ± 2017 (June) 71 16 87 81.60 
Total                188 244 432            43.51 
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Table 3: Comparison between IPOs trading on the when-issued (WI) market and those 
that do not 
Panel A reports information for the IPOs that trade on the when-issued (WI) market while Panel B reports 
information for both groups of firms and for the whole sample. WI stands for when-issued. WI days is the 
number of days for which the WI period lasts. Ret (1st day WI) is the return on the first day of the when-issued 
market and is calculated as (closing price on the 1st day of the WI market ± issue price)/issue price). Vol (1st 
day WI) is the volume on the first day of the WI market. Av. Volume is the average volume in the WI market, 
excluding that on the first day of the WI market. WI bid-ask spd 1 is the percentage bid-ask spread during the 
WI period and is calculated using the formula (ask price ± bid price)/ask price. WI bid-ask spd 2 is the relative 
bid-ask spread during the WI period. Age is the number of years from incorporation to flotation date. Inverse of 
Price is the inverse of the offer price and is calculated as (1/offer price).  Price (£) is the issue price in £. Ret 
(1st uncond.) is the return on the first day of unconditional trading and is calculated as (closing price on the 1st 
day of unconditional trading ± issue price)/issue price. TA(million £) is the total assets for the year prior to the 
IPO, expressed in million £. Size of Syndicate is the number of banks in the syndicate that underwrites the 
offer. Commission (% GP) is the money paid to the syndicate for selling the IPO shares, expressed as a 
percentage of the GP. Reputation 1 and 2 refer to the reputation of the underwriter based on the number of 
IPOs it advised and the gross proceeds it raised during the two years before the IPO took place, expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of IPOs advised on and gross proceeds raised in the entire market during these 
two years. Volume is calculated as volume of number of shares traded/outstanding shares. Av.Vol (20 days) is 
the average volume during the 20 days of unconditional trading, excluding that on the first day of unconditional 
trading. Average bid-ask spread 1 and 2 refer to the percentage and relative bid-ask spreads respectively during 
the first month, excluding the first day, of unconditional trading. Secondary is the percentage of gross proceeds 
raised from the selling of existing shares in the IPO and is calculated as gross proceeds from existing 
shares/total gross proceeds. Ret FTSE refers to the return on the FTSE All-Share Index during the two-month 
period ending ten days before the first day of trading. Vol FTSE is the volatility of the FTSE All-Share Index 
over the two-month period ending two days before the first day of trading. N is the number of IPOs. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
IPOs with WI Market 
(N = 188) 
IPOs with no WI 
Market (N = 244) 
All IPOs 
(N = 432) 
Difference 
in Means 
Difference 
in 
Medians 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median p-value p-value 
Panel A 
WI Days 3.57 3.09 
  
  
  
Ret (1st day WI, %)  13.26 6.58 
  
  
  
Vol (1st day WI, %)   20.65 11.42 
  
  
  
Av. Volume (%) 3.01 1.81 
  
  
  
WI bid-ask spd 1 (%) 1.77 1.08 
  
  
  
WI bid-ask spd 2 (%) 1.74 1.12 
  
  
  
Panel B 
Age (years) 5.86 2.21 7.55 3.36 6.77 2.58 0.08* 0.06* 
Inverse of Price 0.45 0.46 0.94 0.73 0.80 0.66 0.03** 0.00*** 
Price (£) 3.75 2.62 1.71 1.48 2.39 1.90 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Ret (1st uncond %) 15.00 8.41 18.26 11.78 16.82 9.50 0.19 0.00*** 
TA (million £) 1234.18 266.06 38.08 14.45 390.71 27.50 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Size of Syndicate 4.72 4.10 1.53 1.04 2.45 2.17 0.00*** 0.00*** 
&RP¶sion (% GP) 3.47 3.21 2.21 1.82 2.55 2.44 0.00*** 0.00*** 
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Table 3 continues 
Reputation 1 (%) 5.64 4.48 2.54 2.35 3.34 2.68 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Reputation 2 (%) 9.01 4.75 3.82 2.02 4.54 0.87 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Volume (%) 1.77 1.02 7.45 6.11 5.64 2.66 0.02** 0.03** 
Av. Vol. (20 days, %) 0.80 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.58 0.50 0.00*** 0.00*** 
bid-ask spd 1 (%) 2.03 1.52 3.24 2.70 2.91 2.42 0.00*** 0.00*** 
bid-ask spd 2 (%) 2.04 1.53 3.60 2.61 3.26 2.44 0.03** 0.00*** 
Secondary (%) 31.72 21.08 37.11 34.44 36.36 33.24 0.23 0.14 
Ret FTSE (%) 1.24 1.45 2.30 2.34 1.92 1.92 0.03** 0.04** 
Vol FTSE (%) 0.82 0.74 0.80 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.35 0.20 
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Table 4: First stage multinomial regression. 
 
The dependent variable takes a value of one if the IPO traded in when-issued market, a value of 2 if the IPO 
is placing and zero otherwise. Dummy_(Technology) is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the IPO 
is from a technology company and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 3. N is the 
number of observations. Year dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. We use robust 
standard errors in our analysis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels respectively. 
 Model 1 (outcome=1) Model 2 (outcome=2) 
Variables coeff. 
 
p-value coeff. 
 
p-value 
Intercept 
-4.255*** 
 
0.000 -4.835*** 
 
0.000 
Inv_Price 
-0.030* 
 
0.096 -0.027* 
 
0.082 
TA 0.493** 
 
0.011 0.209** 
 
0.022 
Secondary 
-0.090* 
 
0.058 -0.562* 
 
0.094 
Underwriter_Rep. (GP) 0.057* 
 
0.053 0.023* 
 
0.063 
Age 0.175 
 
0.234 0.403 
 
0.538 
Ret_(FTSE All-Share Index) 
-0.033 
 
0.656 -0.009 
 
0.412 
Vol_(FTSE All-Share Index) 0.276 
 
0.772 0.573 
 
0.785 
Dummy_(Technology) 0.203 
 
0.665 0.743 
 
0.177 
Yearly_Dummies Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Pseudo R-square (%) 28% 
 
 
  
 
N 432 
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Table 5: Second-stage regression estimates of the offer price. 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (1+ offer price). Book_to_Market is the book value 
divided by the market value of equity. ȜP1) and ȜP2) are the first and second order polynomial 
approximations using the Dahl (2002) method estimated from first stage multinomial regression.  
Book_to_Market is the book value divided by the market value of equity. All other variables are as defined 
in Table 3. N is the number of observations. Year dummies are included in the regressions but are not 
reported. We use robust standard errors in our analysis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
IPOs with when-issued 
markets 
IPOs without when-issued 
markets 
 
coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
Intercept 1.638*** 0.001 1.275*** 0.000 
TA 0.649*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.099 
Book_to_Market 
-0.167*** 0.001 -0.152*** 0.000 
Age 
-0.208*** 0.003 -0.140*** 0.000 
Dummy_(Technology) 0.552** 0.021 0.027 0.614 
Vol_(FTSE All-Share Index) 0.338 0.129 -0.266*** 0.000 
Underwriter_Rep. (GP) 0.059*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.000 
Secondary 0.284 0.181 0.312*** 0.000 
ȜP1) -0.380*** 0.005 -0.107*** 0.000 
ȜP2) -0.012 0.989 0.243*** 0.000 
Yearly_Dummies Yes Yes 
R-square (%) 17.5% 13% 
N 188 244 
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Table 6: Comparison between the actual and estimated offer prices 
The table compares the average actual offer price (£) with the estimated price had the company chosen the 
other alternative (to have or not have a when-issued market). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Average offer price for the 188 IPOs that had a 
when-issued market 
Average offer price for the 244 IPOs that did 
not have a when-issued market 
 
Actual 
offer 
price 
Estimated offer 
price if the 
company had not 
had a when-issued 
market 
Difference in 
Means/Medians 
(p-value) 
Actual 
offer 
price 
Estimated offer 
price if the 
company had had 
a when-issued 
market 
Difference in 
Means/Medians 
(p-value) 
Mean 3.75 2.765 0.021** 1.710 2.473 0.011** 
Median 2.62 2.122 0.041** 1.48 1.976 0.016** 
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Table 7: Impact of when-issued market on trading volume 
This table reports the results of an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the volume on the 
first day of trading and is calculated as (volume on the first day of trading/outstanding shares). All 
variables are as defined as in Table 3. N is the number of observations. Year dummies are included in the 
regressions but are not reported. We use robust standard errors in our analysis. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Volume 
 
coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.131** 0.011 
Dummy_(WI) 0.097** 0.010 
Secondary 0.044 0.169 
Inv_Price 0.010*** 0.001 
Age -0.023** 0.038 
TA 0.002* 0.058 
Book_to_Market -0.011*** 0.002 
Dummy_(Technology) 0.017 0.609 
Underwriter_Rep. (GP) 0.003** 0.023 
Return_(FTSE All-Share Index) 0.002 0.540 
Volatility_(FTSE All-Share Index) -0.056 0.227 
Yearly_Dummies Yes 
R-square (%) 17.1% 
N 432 
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Table 8: Accuracy of the when-issued market prices versus the offer price 
This table reports the pricing errors in the when-issued market prices and the offer price relative to the 
closing price on the first day of unconditional trading. WI stands for when-issued. The errors are calculated 
based on the following formulas: Error from first day in the WI = (closing price on first day of 
unconditional trading ± first-day closing price in the WI)/first-day closing price in the WI. Error from 
midpoint day in the WI = (closing price on the first day of unconditional trading ± midpoint-day closing 
price in the WI)/midpoint-day closing price in the WI. Error from last day in the WI = (closing price on the 
first day of unconditional trading ± last-day closing price in the WI)/last-day closing price in the WI. Error 
from offer price = (closing price on the first day of unconditional trading ± offer price)/offer price. The 
difference in means looks at whether each of the mean when-issued price errors is significantly different 
from the offer price error. All means and standard deviations (Sd) are in percentages. Panel A includes all 
the IPOs that had when-issued dealing. Panel B includes only those IPOs that had overpricing or a zero 
return on the first day of unconditional trading. Panel C includes only those IPOs that had underpricing on 
the first day of unconditional trading. N is the number of IPOs. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
When-Issued Price Errors Offer Price Error Difference in Means 
 
Mean (%) p-value Sd (%) 
Mean 
(%) 
p-
value 
Sd 
(%) p-value 
Panel A: All IPOs 
First day in the WI  0.977 0.140 7.568 
   
0.00*** 
Midpoint day in the 
WI 0.596 0.313 6.153    0.00*** 
Last day in the WI 0.407 0.307 3.950 
   
0.00*** 
Offer price 
  
11.33*** 0.00 22 
 
N 188 
Panel B: Overpriced and zero-return IPOs 
First day in the WI  
-2.979** 0.022 7.571 
   
0.101 
Midpoint day in the 
WI -0.874 0.202 4.521    0*** 
Last day in the WI 
-0.950 0.165 3.349 
   
0*** 
Offer price 
  
-3.39*** 0 4.98 
 
N 57 
Panel C: Underpriced IPOs 
First day in the WI  2.399** 0.000 6.439 
   
0*** 
Midpoint day in the 
WI 1.142* 0.094 6.500    0*** 
Last day in the WI 0.418 0.200 2.755 
   
0*** 
Offer price 
  
15.25*** 0 23.25 
 
N 131 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
Table 9: When-issued market prices as unbiased estimates of the closing price on 
the first day of unconditional trading 
This table reports the results of the Mincer-Zarnowitz test for unbiasedness. We run the following 
regression: 3&3 Dȕ3:,LİL. PCP is the true price and here is proxied by the closing price on the 
first day of unconditional trading. PWIi refers to each of the when-issued market prices or the offer 
price. Unbiasedness would lead to a = 0 and ȕ = 1. We use the Wald test for the joint null hypothesis 
Ho:  a = 0 and ȕ = 1 and the p-values are reported in the last column. The p-values for the individual 
coefficients are reported in parentheses. We make use of robust standard errors. WI stands for when-
issued. Panel A includes all the IPOs that had when-issued dealing. Panel B includes only those IPOs 
that had overpricing or a zero return on the first day of unconditional trading. Panel C includes only 
those IPOs that had underpricing on the first day of unconditional trading. N is the number of IPOs. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
 
constant coeff. R square p-value for Ho: 
    
constant=0; coeff.=1 
Panel A: All IPOs 
First-day price in WI 0.714 1.081*** 0.991 0.779 
 
(0.775) (0.000) 
  
Midpoint-day price in WI 0.891 0.899*** 0.986 0.853 
 
(0.697) (0.000) 
  
Last-day price in WI 
-4.466 1.022*** 0.997 0.469 
 
(0.441) (0.000) 
  
Offer price 0.384 1.059*** 0.988 0.051** 
 
(0.772) (0.000) 
  
N 188 
Panel B: Overpriced and zero-return IPOs 
First-day price in WI 0.138 1.065*** 0.995 0.449 
 
(0.889) (0.000) 
 
 
Midpoint-day price in WI 0.599 1.029*** 0.982 0.585 
 
(0.661) (0.000) 
 
 
Last-day price  in WI 3.025 0.883*** 0.985 0.620 
 
(0.148) (0.000) 
 
 
Offer price 1.301 1.002*** 0.985 0.052* 
 
(0.402) (0.000) 
  
N 57 
Panel C: Underpriced IPOs 
First-day price in WI 0.221 1.027*** 0.996 0.442 
 
(0.441) (0.000) 
 
 
Midpoint-day price in WI 0.320 0.898*** 0.981 0.230 
 
(0.355) (0.000) 
 
 
Last-day price  in WI 
-0.078 1.001*** 0.997 0.428 
 
(0.884) (0.000) 
 
 
Offer price 0.179 0.898*** 0.998 0.062* 
 
(0.492) (0.000) 
  
N 131 
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Table 10: Propensity score matching 
 
This table shows the results of propensity score matching. Each IPO firm that chooses to trade on the grey 
market is matched with non-grey market IPOs by age, size and secondary shares offered at the time of IPO. 
Panel A shows grey market IPOs¶ characteristics and matched sample, while Panel B shows the offer price for 
grey market IPOs and that of matched non-grey market IPOs.  Age is the number of years from incorporation to 
flotation. Size is the total assets of the firm the year prior to the IPO. Secondary is the percentage of gross 
proceeds raised from the selling of existing shares in the IPO and is calculated as gross proceeds from existing 
shares/total gross proceeds. Offer price is the offer price at the time of listing. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Univariate analysis Grey Market  Matched sample 
Panel A Mean Median  Mean Median 
Age 5.606 3.172  4.821 3.063 
Size (m) 1256 245  1147 257 
Secondary proceeds (%) 22.618 16.661  22.608 17.669 
      
N 91   84  
      
Panel B      
Offer price 3.788 2.648  2.530** 2.137** 
No of obs. 91   84  
 
 
 
 
 
